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I. INTRODUCTION 
The histories of Canada, the United States, New Zealand and 
Australia, despite considerable differences, have certain common features. 
These countries were originally inhabited solely by aboriginal peoples 
organized in relatively small-scale societies. At various stages, Great Britain 
asserted sovereignty over these territories, and proceeded to introduce 
European settlers and to establish novel legal and political institutions. Over 
time, the settlers grew to outnumber the native people, and the new British-
derived institutions assumed a position of dominance. English law was 
generally introduced. Much of the land originally held by native peoples 
passed into settler hands, by processes ranging from peaceful agreement to 
forcible dispossession. In recent times, all of these countries have witnessed 
a resurgence of native political and cultural activity. All are confronted with 
a number of complex and inter-related legal problems concerning native 
people, problems inherited from colonial times. Among these, the issue of 
aboriginal title is perhaps the most significant. 
The question is this. When the British Crown claimed sovereignty over 
a territory and introduced new laws and legal institutions, what impact did 
this have on the land rights held by aboriginal peoples? Were those rights 
nullified, or did they survive in a form cognizable by Crown courts? The 
issue is complicated by the fact that at least three distinct legal systems may 
be involved: the law of the incoming sovereign, native customary law, and 
international law. 
In Canada, the subject has recently assumed particular prominence. 
The Constitution Act of 1982 recognizes and affirms the "existing 
aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada.'" Yet its 
meaning and effect are controversial. The term "aboriginal rights" is not 
defined, and the qualifying word "existing" is susceptible of varying inter-
pretations. 
My aim here is to explore the principal ways in which North American 
and Commonwealth courts have traditionally approached the question of 
aboriginal land rights. At least five distinct attitudes may be noted. I will 
call them: a) the doctrine of a legal vacuum; b) the doctrine of radical 
discontinuity; c) the doctrine of continuity; d) the doctrine of common law 
dispossession; and e) the doctrine of aboriginal title. These doctrines are 
' Section 35(1 ). 
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hardly of equal weight, either in terms of their intrinsic merits or of the 
authority with which they have been advanced. Several, indeed, are more in 
the nature of judicial flights of fancy than doctrines of real substance. 
Others were developed primarily to deal with situations arising in India and 
Africa, and are of uncertain relevance in North American and Antipodean 
settings. 
I propose, therefore, to discuss the first four doctrines only briefly. 
The remainder of the paper will be devoted to the doctrine of aboriginal 
title, which represents the most significant judicial attempt made so far to 
assess the legal effects on native land rights of the advent of Europeans in 
North America, and, by extension, in New Zealand and Australia. 
II. THE DOCTRINE OF A LEGAL VACUUM 
This theory holds that a territory inhabited by so-called ''primitive 
peoples" was legally equivalent to a desert land, what is termed terra 
nullius. The native inhabitants were mere wanderers over the surface of the 
land, possessing neither sovereignty nor permanent rights of any sort to the 
territories they occupied. On this view, while indigenous peoples may have 
constituted a practical obstacle to European penetration, they posed no 
more of a legal hindrance than did the wild animals of the forests and 
plains. Their countries were supposedly open to European appropriation by 
such methods as discovery, symbolic acts, or occupation, - mod{;!s of ac-
quisition suited to vacant territories -, without any need to obtain the con-
sent of the inhabitants, or even to conquer them. Territories acquired in this 
manner would persumably be governed exclusively by laws introduced by 
the incoming European sovereign, who would be vested automatically with 
complete title.to the soil and unqualified powers of disposition. The land 
rights, customary laws and governmental structures of the native peoples 
would have no legal existence, except where expressly recognized by the new 
sovereign. 
This remarkable doctrine is enunciated in the Nova Scotia case of Rex 
v. Syliboy,2 decided in 1928. Justice Patterson affirmed: 
. . . the Indians were never regarded as an independent power. A civilized 
nation first discovering a country of uncivilized people or savages held 
such country as its own until such time as by treaty it was transferred to 
some other civilized nation. The savages' rights of sovereignty even of 
ownership were never recognized. Nova Scotia has passed to Great Britain 
not by gift or purchase from or even by conquest of the Indians but by 
treaty with France, which had acquired it by priority of discovery and 
ancient possession; and the Indians passed with it. 
It is not easy for us today to give much credence to this view. When 
Europeans first came to America and the Antipodes, they encountered 
numerous bodies of indigenous peoples, occupying definite territories to the 
exclusion of other groups, factually independent, sovereign within their 
borders, and vested with their own customary laws and political systems. As 
Justice Judson of the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted, "the fact is 
that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies 
2 [1929) I D.L.R. 307 at 313 (N .S. Co. Ct.). 
3 
4 Doctrine of a Legal Vacuum 
and occupying the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. " 3 To the 
contemporary mind, aboriginal territories were hardly "vacant land" in 
any sense of the term. 
However the doctrine of a legal vacuum does not confine itself to 
modern viewpoints. In its most developed form it contends, not that we 
would be justified today in ignoring the territorial rights of indigenous 
peoples, but that as a matter of historical fact the colonial powers did 
precisely this. However repugnant colonial attitudes may appear to the 
modern observor (it is argued), a court is obliged to take them into account 
in determining the legal impact of European rule upon native peoples at the 
relevant historical period. 
A detailed appraisal of the historical accuracy of these views cannot be 
given here. Suffice it to say that they seem sustainable only on a highly 
selective view of the historical evidence. In North America, for example, 
European state practice was diverse and contradictory regarding such mat-
ters as the status of Indian nations and their territories, the efficacy of 
discovery and symbolic acts of appropriation, the nature of treaties con-
cluded with Indians, the position of Indian customary laws, and so on. 
While European sovereigns often made extravagant territorial claims on 
their own accounts, they usually proved more circumspect when it came to 
appraising the claims of rival powers, and they often adopted yet another 
posture in direct dealings with Indian nations. While a certain amount of 
evidence supports the contention that European sovereigns viewed North 
America as terra nullius and treated its native inhabitants as lacking any 
corporate legal existence or land rights, there is a considerable body of 
historical data inconsistent with this view.4 Any proper assessment must 
take both bodies of evidence into account. 
A few examples may be cited. Blackstone, in bis Commentaries on the 
Laws of England, divides colonial territories into two categories, depending 
in effect on whether or not they were terra nul/ius when the Crown entered. 
If they were vacant, then they could be acquired by mere occupancy; if they 
3 Calderv. Attorney-General of British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 156 
(S.C.C.). 
• See, e.g., Cyrus Thomas, "Introduction" in Indian Land Cessions in the United 
States by Charles C. Royce, (1896-97) Eighteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of 
American Ethnology, Part II (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1899); Jack Stagg, Anglo-Indian Relations in North America to 1763 and an 
Analysis of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763 (Ottawa: Research 
Bra?ch, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1981); Brian Slattery, "French 
Claims in North America, 1500-59" (1978), 59 Canadian Historical Review 139 
reprinted as No. 1, Studies in Aboriginal Rights (Saskatoon: University of 
S~skatchewan N.ative Law Centre, 1980); Brian Slattery, Land Rights of In-
digenous Canadian Peoples, as Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their 
Terr!tories, Doctora~ Di~sertation, Faculty of Law, Oxford University, 1979, 
reprinted by the Umvers1ty of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre 1979 esp. at 
66-125. ' , 
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were already populated, they could only be gained by conquest or cession. 
His words are as follows: 
Plantations, or colonies in distant countries, are either such where the 
lands are claimed by right of occupancy only, by finding them desert and 
uncultivated, and peopling them from the mother country; or where, 
when already cultivated, they have been either gained by conquest, or 
ceded to us by treaties.' 
There is a certain ambiguity in this passage. At first sight, the author 
might seem to suggest that a territory, although populated, could be regard-
ed as vacant if it were not cultivated by the inhabitants, but used primarily 
for pastoral purposes, or for hunting, fishing and gathering. The argument 
could then be made that the hunting territories of American Indians were 
"desert" and open to occupation by settlers. However Blackstone goes on 
to dispell this impression, stating that the American plantations were prin-
cipally of the conquered and ceded variety "being obtained in the last cen-
tury either by right of conquest and driving out the natives {with what 
natural justice I shall not at present enquire) or by treaties. " 6 The American 
colonies were not gained by mere occupancy, for the simple reason that they 
were for the most part already supplied with inhabitants. 
Blackstone elaborates on this point in a subsequent chapter of the 
Commentaries where he discusses the origins of the institution of property. 
After a period of primitive communality, he writes, mankind reached a 
stage where it became an acknowledged right for a person to occupy any 
lands not already occupied by others. "Upon the same principle", he 
declares, 
was founded the right of migration, of sending colonies to find out new 
habitations, when the mother-country was overcharged with inhabitants; 
which was practised as well by the Phaenicians and Greeks, as the Ger-
mans, Scythians, and other northern people. And, so long as it was con-
fined to the stocking and cultivation of desert uninhabited countries, it 
kept strictly within the limits of the law of nature. But how far the seizing 
on countries already peopled, and driving out or massacring the innocent 
and defenceless natives, merely because they differed from their invaders 
in language, in religion, in customs, in government, or in colour; how far 
such a conduct was consonant to nature, to reason, or to christianity, 
' William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, !st ed. (Oxford; 
Clarendon Press, 1765),, Vol. I, 104; spelling modernized. 
• Ibid., at 105. It seems clear that Blackstone included in this statement the 
populous colonies on the American continent, and not merely the island colonies 
of the Caribbean. Certainly a later American editor understands him in this sense; 
see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, ed. by St. 
George Tucker (Philadelphia: Birch and Small, 1803), Vol. I, Appendix, 381~84. 
The suggestion that Blackstone had the Caribbean colonies in mind was made in 
Milirrpum v. Naba/co Pty. Ltd. (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 at 202 (Aust. N.T.S.C.), 
but this view seems to have no historical or textual basis. 
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deserved well to be considered by those, who have rendered their names 
immortal by thus civilizing mankind.' 
It was not legitimate, then, to seize populated territories merely because 
their inhabitants had different customs and religions. Such countries could 
not be deemed "vacant" and open to occupation. 
· The issue arose in a concrete form following the Treaty of Paris (1763), 
in which France and Spain ceded to Britain their claims to extensive 
American territories. At that period there was considerable pressure from 
the old! British colonies along the Atlantic seaboard to settle the lands west 
of the Appalachians, which were held by the Indians. The British Crown 
could have maintained that such lands, being for the most part un-
cultivated, were open to European occupancy without consideration of In-
dian title. However the Crown did not adopt this view. On 7 October 1763, 
a Royal Proclamation was issued containing extensive provisions regardling 
Indian lands. The preamble to this part recites that 
it is just and reasonable, and essential to Our Interest and the Security of 
Our Colonies that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians, with whom 
We are conn~cted and who live under Our Protection, should not be 
molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions 
and Territories as, not having been ceded to, or purchased by Us, are 
reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Groundls .... ' 
The Proclamation, then, treats Indian nations as protected peopl~s 
under the Crown's overall sovereignty, and presupposes that they retam 
rights to unceded lands in their possession. It goes on to lay down detailed 
provisions protecting Indian lands from encroachment and fraudulent pur-
chases. In particular it forbids colonial Governors to grant away unsur-
rendered Indian lands and prohibits settlement on them. Private purchases 
of Indian lands are outlawed, and a system of public purchases is 
substituted. 9 
The Proclamation's provisions were reinforced by Royal Instructions 
sent that same year to the Governors of the new colonies of Quebec, East 
Florida, and West Florida. 10 The Instructions for Quebec (which are vir-
tually identical with those issued for the Floridas) recite that the province 
"is in part inhabited and possessed by several nations and tribes of Indians, 
with whom it is both necessary and expedient to cultivate and maintain a 
strict friendship and good correspondence, so that they may be induced by 
1 Blackstone, supra, note 5, 1st ed., II, 7; spelling modlernized. . . 
' Text in Clarence S. Brigham, ed., British Royal Proclamatwns Relatmg to 
America, Vol. 12, Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian 
Society (Worcester, Mass.: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 212-18, at .215. 
• For detailed analysis of the Proclamation's provisions, see Slattery, Land Rights 
of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at 191-349: . . 
10 Text in Leonard W. Labaree, ed., Royal Instructions to Bnt1sh Colonial Gover-
nors, 1670-1776, 2 vols. (New Yorlc: D. Appleton-Century Comp., 1935), Vol. II, 
478-80. 
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degrees not only to be good neighbours to our subjects but likewise 
themselves to become good subjects to us ... ". The Governor of Quebec 
should appoint persons "to assemble and treat with the said Indians, prom-
ising and assuring them of protection and friendship on our part. .. ". The 
Instructions also require the Governor to determine the number, nature and 
disposition of the Indian tribes "and the rules and constitutions by which 
they are governed or regulated". The document goes on to state: "you are 
upon no account to molest or disturb them [the Indian tribes] in the posses-
sion of such parts of the said province as they at present occupy or possess ,, 
Many other examples of this type could be cited. The few given here 
may serve to counter the notion that European powers uniformly dealt with 
North American lands as if they were vacant, ignoring the presence of the 
aboriginal peoples. 
III. THE DOCTRINE OF RADICAL DISCONTINUITY 
This theory, unlike the first, does not necessarily maintain that native 
peoples possessed no rights to their lands prior to European rule. It holds 
that, in British law, whenever the Crown acquires a new overseas. territory, 
be it by conquest, cession, or peaceful settlement, the land rights of the local 
people are automatically terminated. The Crown obtains a complete title to 
the soil and absolute powers of disposal. There is a radical discontinuity 
between the situation prior to the Crown's coming and that prevailing after-
wards. Whatever land rights the native inhabitants enjoy under the new 
regime must trace their origin to some official act of the incoming 
sovereign. 
Authority for this proposition derives mainly from dicta in several 
Privy Council decisions concerning India. 11 A striking example is found in 
Vajesingji Joravarsingji v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 12 where 
Lord Dunedin said: 
... when a territory is acquired by a sovereign state for the first time that 
is an act of state. It matters not how the acquisition has been brought 
about. It may be by conquest, it may be by cession following on treaty, it 
may be by occupation of territory hitherto unoccupied by a recognised 
ruler. In all cases the result is the same. Any inhabitant of the territory can 
make good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only 
such rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such 
rights as he had under the rule of predecessors avail him nothing. 
It seems doubtful whether this can be taken as a correct statement of 
the law, at least in this bald form. There is a basic difference between 
recognizing that the Crown may lawfully appropriate privately-held proper-
ty when a new territory is acquired, and asserting that all private land rights 
are automatically nullified without any Crown action at all. The decisions 
which appear to espouse a doctrine of radical discontinuity can, I think, be 
explained on another basis: at the time the particular territories in question 
were acquired, the Crown explicitly elected to review local property rights, 
and proceeded to modify or terminate some of these." This is very different 
'' For discussion and references see Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian 
Peoples, supra, note 4, at 45-62. 
" (1924), L.R. 51 Ind. App. 357 at 360 (P.C.). 
" See Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at 
50-59. 
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from the situation where the Crown is content to let the existing situation 
stand without acting one way or the other, or where it implicitly accepts ex-
isting property rights in its dealings with the local inhabitants. 
In any case, it is difficult to see how the proposed doctrine could be 
carried out in a thoroughgoing way. Can it seriously be maintained that at 
the instant of acquisition the total population of a country become squatters 
in their own dwellings, and trespassers in their own gardens? The result is so 
drastic that it seems implausible that it should occur by the silent and 
automatic operation of the law alone, without definite state action. 
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF CONTINUITY 
A more sophisticated view of the law can be found in a series of Privy 
Council decisions originating mainly from Africa that adopt a principle of 
presumptive continuity. This doctrine distinguishes between sovereignty 
and private property rights and holds that the Crown's acquisition of 
sovereignty over a new territory does not automatically entail the confisca-
tion of all private property. Rather the presumption is to the contrary. 
Although the Crown initially holds the power to terminate local property 
rights as an act of state, if it elects not to exercise that power, then local 
rights are presumed to survive intact, subject to any modifications 
necessarily flowing from the change of sovereignty proper. This doctrine 
posits a measure of legal continuity between the old regime and the new, in 
the absence of official acts to the contrary. 
The principle of continuity was adopted by the Privy Council in 
Oyekan v. Adele,' 4 where Lord Denning summarized the effect of the 
Crown's acquisition of sovereignty over a newly ceded territory in the 
following manner: 
The effect ... is to give to the British Crown sovereign power to make 
laws and to enforce them, and, therefore, the power to recognise existing 
rights or extinguish them, or to create new ones. In order to ascertain what 
rights pass to the Crown or are retained by the inhabitants, the courts of 
law look ... to the conduct of the British Crown. It has been laid down 
by their Lordships' Board that "Any inhabitant of the territory can make 
good in the municipal courts established by the new sovereign only such 
rights as that sovereign has, through his officers, recognised. Such rights 
as he had under the rule of his predecessors avail him nothing." ... In in-
quiring, however, what rights are recognised, there is one guiding princi-
ple. It is this: The courts will assume that the British Crown intends that 
the rights of property of the inhabitants are to be fully respected. 
This doctrine suggests that, absent contrary acts, the original land 
rights of native peoples survived the process whereby the Crown gained con-
trol over their territories. Its application in the North American context was 
accepted by Justice Hall of the Supreme Court of Canada in Calder v. 
Attorney-General of British Columbia,' 5 where he stated: 
•• [1957] 2 All E.R. 785 at 788 (P.C.); references omitted. For other authorities see 
Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at 49, 
50-62. 
" (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 at 208 (S.C.C.). 
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The appe~Iants [officers of the Nishga Indian Tribal Council] rely on the 
presumption that the British Crown intended to respect native rights· 
therefore, wh.en the Nishga people came under British sovereignty .. '. 
they v.:ere e?tltled to assert, as a legal right, their Indian title. It being a 
legal nght, it could not thereafter be extinguished except by surrender to 
th~ Cr~wn or by competent legislative authority, and then only by specific 
legislation. 
V. THE DOCTRINE OF COMMON LAW DISPOSSESSION 
The theory of discontinuity occasionally assumes a somewhat different 
form. This doctrine holds that in instances where English law is introduced 
into a newly-acquired territory the local inhabitants are automatically 
deprived of their existing land rights. This is thought to come about, not 
because of the change of sovereignty itself (which is the theory considered 
above), but because of the application of English law. The reasoning is as 
follows. It is a fundamental principle of English law that the King is the 
original proprietor and lord paramount of all lands within the realm, and 
the sole source of title to the soil. The courts will only recognize private land 
titles which can be shown to derive, directly or indirectly, from a Crown 
grant. The local inhabitants of a newly-acquired territory normally cannot 
show this, as their titles stem from ancient possession or other sources pre-
dating the advent of the Crown. Therefore, the doctrine contends, their 
rights cannot be recognized in the courts of the new sovereign. 
This viewpoint was expressed in the Australian case of Milirrpum v. 
Nabalco Pty. Ltd. ,. 16 where Blackburn J. refers to "the principle, fun-
damental to the English law of real property, that the Crown is the source of 
title to all land; that no subject can own land allodially, but only an estate or 
interest in it which he holds mediately or immediately of the Crown." He 
goes on to conclude: "On the foundation of New South Wales, therefore, 
and of South Australia, every square inch of territory in the colony became 
the property of the Crown. All titles, rights, and interests whatever in land 
which existed thereafter in subjects of the Crown were the direct conse-
quence of some grant from the Crown." Native Australian peoples were 
therefore automatically deprived of their ancestral lands. 
The argument rests on the premise that when English law replaces a 
local legal system all rights held under the former system which do not con-
form to English law automatically cease. The land rights of the local in-
habitants are said to be void, not because the Crown has nullified them, but 
simply because they do not satisfy the requirements of English property 
law. The premise, once stated in a general form, appears highly ques-
tionable. It can hardly be true, for example, that marriages validly con-
tracted under the old local law would be automatically dissolved for failure 
to conform to the new English rules governing place of marriage, parental 
•• (1971), 17 F.L.R. 141 at 245 (Aust. N.T.S.C.). 
12 
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consent, number of witnesses, and so on. To take a case closer to home it 
cannot easily be imagined that a person who had inherited lands under l~al 
law prior to the changeover would now find himself disinherited in favour 
of a third party by the retroactive operation of English rules of succession. 
These examples concern rights which in their origins fail to satisfy the re-
quirements of English law. Similar considerations govern rights whose 
character and incidents are unknown to the Eng Mish system. Would a con-
tract of a type not recognized in English law (moral questions apart) be 
nullified upon the changeover? Again, would a right to moveable property 
whose incidents are foreign to English concepts be rescinded ipso facto? 
The true rule is that where English law is introduced mto a territory the 
new system does not operate retroactively so as to nullify private rights held 
under the former legal regime, at least if they do not present morally offen-
sive features. The requirements of English law concerning the creation and 
transfer of rights operate only for the future. It seems to follow that private 
land rights held under local law will not be invalidated by the introduction 
of English law, even though such rights may not conform, in character or 
origins, to the new system. There is scope, then, for the courts to recognize 
land rights held by local inhabitants which stem, not from a Crown grant, 
but from sources pre-dating the introduction of English common law. 
The issue arose in Quebec following the publication of the Royal Proc-
lam~tion of October 1763. This provided, among other things, that the in-
habitants of the newly-acquired province might confide in the Crown's pro-
tection "for the Enjoyment of the Benefit of the Laws of Our Realm of 
England'', and that courts of justice would be erected to determine all 
causes, both criminal and civil, "according to Law and Equity, and as near 
as may be agreeable to the Laws of England". 11 The potential impact of this 
provision upon the French inhabitants caused widespread consternation in 
the province, and led eventually to the restoration of French law in civil 
matters in the Quebec Act of 1774. What is interesting for our purposes is 
the fact that the law officers of the Imperial Crown, called in at various 
points to express their views on the effects of the Proclamation's provisions, 
agreed that they should not be read as altering local property rights held 
under French law. 
The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General of England, Yorke and 
De Grey, referred in their report of 1766 to the alarm and disorder 
engendered in Quebec by certain interpretations put upon the Royal Proc-
lamation of 1763. 
As if it were his Royal Intentions . . . at once to abolish all the usages and 
Customs of Canada, with the rough hand of a Conqueror rather than with 
the true Spirit of a Lawful Sovereign, and not so much to extend the pro-
tection and Benefit of his English Laws to His new subjects, by securing 
their Lives, Libertys and propertys with more certainty than in former 
11 Brigham, supra, note 8, at 214. 
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times, as to impose new, unnecessary and arbitrary Rules, especially in the 
Titles to Land, and in the modes of Descent Alienation and Settlement, 
which tend to confound and subvert rights, instead of supporting them. 
The law officers went on to advise that in all actions relating to land it 
would be oppressive to disturb without much deliberation the prevailing 
French custom, for "to introduce at one Stroke the English Law of Real 
Estates ... must occasion infinite confusion and Injustice". They thought 
it might therefore be appropriate for the Governor of Quebec to issue an ex-
planatory proclamation quieting the minds of the populace as to the true 
meaning of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 regarding local customs and 
usages, "more especially in Titles of Land and Cases of Real property." 18 
A subsequent Attorney-General of England, Edward Thurlow, con-
curred with this view in a report on Quebec composed in 1773. He wrote: 
The Canadians seem to have been strictly entitled by thejus gentium 
to their property, as they possessed it upon the capitulation and treaty of 
peace, together with all its qualities and incidents, by tenure or otherwise, 
and also to their personal liberty; for both which they were to expect your 
Majesty's gracious protection. 
It seems a necessary consequence that all those laws by which that 
property was created, defined, and secured must be continued to them. To 
introduce any other, as Mr. Yorke and Mr. De Grey emphatically ex-
pressed it, tend to confound and subvert rights instead of supporting 
them." 
Rather than holding that English law nullified existing property rights, 
the law officers reasoned that the continued presence of those rights 
softened the impact of English law, which took effect subject to them and 
not the contrary. 
A similar attitude was exhibited by Justice Monk of the Quebec 
Superior Court in the celebrated case of Connolly v. Woo/rich, 20 where he 
considered the effect of English and French law on the rights and customs 
of Indian peoples in the Hudson's Bay Company Territories and the old 
North-West. Justice Monk was willing to assume, for purposes of argu-
ment, that the first European inhabitants in these areas carried with them 
the law of their parent state as their birthright. However, he pointed out 
that they took only so much of that law as was applicable to the condition 
'"Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds. Documents Relating to the Constitu-
tional History of Canada, 1759-1791, 2nd ed. (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918), I, 
251 at 252, 255, 256; dated 14 April 1766. 
19 Ibid., l, 437 at 443; dated 22 January 1773. See also the Report of the Solicitor-
GeneraI, Alex Wedderburn, of 6 December 1772, ibid., I, 424 at 430; and the 
Report of the Advocate-General, James Marriott, published in 1774, ibid., I, 445 
at 454, 471-72. 
20 (1867), II L.C. Jur. 197 at 204-05 (Que. S.C.); also reported at 17 R.J.R.Q. 75. 
The decision was upheld on appeal sub nom. Johnstone v. Connolly (1869), 17 
R.J.R.Q. 266, I R.L.O.S. 253 (Que. Q.B.). 
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of an infant colony. ''For the artificial refinements and distinctions incident 
to the property of a great and commercial people, ... and a multitude of 
other provisions, were neither necessary nor convenient for them, and 
therefore not in force." In the Canadian North-West, the first settlers en-
countered numerous and powerful Indian tribes, who had long been in 
possession of the country. 
!'low, as I said before, even admitting, for the sake of argument, the ex-
istence . : . of the common law of France, and that of England, at these 
two tradmg posts or establishments respectively, yet, will it be contended 
that the territorial rights, political organization such as it was, or the laws 
and usages of the Indian tribes, were abrogated..:..... that they ceased to exist 
when these two European nations began to trade with the aboriginal oc-
cupants'? In my opinion, it is beyond controversy that they did not - that 
so far from being abolished, they were left in full force, and were not even 
modified in the slightest degree in regard to the civil rights of the natives. 
Nevertheless, where English law is introduced into a country inhabited 
by aboriginal peoples and becomes the dominant legal system, it becomes 
necessary to harmonize native land rights with the common law in some 
way. A number of questions arise. What rights and powers does the Crown 
hold .regarding native lands? Does it possess some sort of underlying title? 
Can 1t grant away lands held by the aboriginal peoples, and what is the legal 
effect of such grants? Other issues arise regarding the relative rights of 
settlers and native peoples. Are settlers free to occupy native lands? Can 
they purchase them from the native owners and obtain good title? A 
number of questions also exist regarding the rights of native peoples 
themselves. What is the legal scope of their title? Does it extend to all 
beneficial uses of the land? Is it tied to traditional uses? How does 
aboriginal title pass from one generation to the next, and from one native 
~rou~ to another? Finally, in what ways may aboriginal title properly be ex-
tmgmshed? The need to answer these and other related questions has given 
rise to a distinct body of judicial principles known as the doctrine of 
aboriginal title. 
This doctrine has sprung not simply from the necessity of fitting 
aboriginal land rights into the common law scheme, but also from the need 
to make some legal sense of the often contradictory historical patterns of 
Crown practice regarding aboriginal peoples, particularly in North 
America. From an early date, far-reaching and often ill-defined claims were 
advanced by the British Crown to American territories, prior to any actual 
control being achieved, or the territories even being explored. These claims 
originally had little or no basis in fact. They were not recognized by the in-
digenous nations and bands actually occupying the regions claimed. They 
often conflicted with equally extravagant claims advanced by rival Euro-
pean powers. They were of questionable legitimacy under international Iaw. 
In most cases, the Crown gained control of territories claimed only after a 
considerable lapse of time, as much as three centuries in certain instances. 
Du:ing the intervening period, there was a good deal of conflicting practice, 
which defies easy summary. On the one hand the Crown granted Charters 
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covering vast territories to various proprietary and corporate bodies, with 
no explicit reservation for Indian rights, at a time when most of the lands 
were under Indian occupation. On the other hand the Crown generally, if 
not always, sought to maintain friendly relations with the Indian nations 
bordering on the settled areas, and often attempted to prevent intrusion on 
Indian lands. At the same time it entered into numerous treaties with native 
peoples, which frequently attributed to them a quasi-autonomous status, as 
protected nations or allies of the Crown. Finally, in most British colonies 
Indian lands were purchased by the government prior to being granted out, 
and private purchases of such lands were prohibited. How can these facts be 
reconciled? The effort to do so leads to the doctrine of aboriginal title, 
which we will now consider. 
A large number of cases might be invoked in any comprehensive 
discussion of this doctrine. My aim here is more modest: to examine in 
detail several early decisions which first expounded the doctrine of 
aboriginal land rights in a developed form, and which have had a substan-
tial influence on subsequent case-law in the United States and Com-
monwealth countries. The cases to be reviewed are two decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court handed down in the early nineteenth century, 
and a decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court of slightly later vintage. I 
will examine the American decisions first. 
VI. THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE 
(JOHNSON v. M'INTOSH) 
John Marshall was Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
when it decided the cases of Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh 
(1823) and Worcester v. State of Georgia (1832). 21 Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote the majority decisions in both cases and brought to his task an in-
timate knowledge of early American history and a familiarity with the 
questi~n of. Indian title. 22 His reasoning in Worcester follows general lines 
estabhshed m the earlier case, with certain significant differences. It will be 
con~~nient here to focus on the Johnson case, referring to Worce;ter for 
clanf1cation and amplification. 23 
In Johnson v. M'lntosh, the plaintiffs laid claim to certain lands in the 
s~a~e of Illinois. T~ey asserted title under conveyances made to private in-
dmduals by the chiefs of the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians in 1773 and 
1775. 24 At the period of purchase, the lands fell within the asserted bound-
aries of the British colony of Virginia, which claimed jurisdiction over ex-
tensive western areas under its original Crown Charters, claims later sur-
rendered to the United States government after the American Revolution. 
2
" 8 Wheaton 543 (U.S.S.C.); 6 Peters 515 (U.S.S.C.). 
22 Marshall was the author of a five volume biography of George Washington, 
which featured a lengthy historical introduction reviewing the genesis of the 
British colonies in America; John Marshall, The Life of George Washington, l st 
ed., 5 vols. (Philadelphia: C.P. Wayne, 1804-07). For biographical details regard-
ing Marshall's previous exposure to questions of Indian title, see L..J. Priestley, 
"Communal Native Title and the Common Law: Further Thoughts on the Gove 
Land Rights Case" (1974), 6 Federal Law Review 150 at 170-71. 
1l Useful discussions of these cases can be found in Howard R. Berman, "The Con-
cept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States" (1978), 
27 Buffalo Law Review 637, and J. Youngblood Henderson, "Unraveling the 
Riddle of Aboriginal Title" (1977), 5 American Indian Law Review 75. 
2
• For a review of these transactions, see Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire 
before the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-70), XI, 
489-91. 
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The same Indian peoples subsequently ceded the lands in question by public 
treaty to the American government, which in turn granted them to the 
defendant. The question was whether the plaintiff's title, acquired directly 
from the Indians, prevailed over the defendant's title, derived from the 
United States government. This in turn raised the question of the relation-
ship between Indian title and the English-derived land system in force in the 
American colonies, later the United States. 
The court's decision is best appreciated in the light of the arguments 
advanced by counsel, which I now turn to. 
A. The Submissions of CounseP 5 
Leading off, the plaintiffs attempted to short-circuit any discussion of 
the nature of Indian title. They contended that nearly all American lands 
were held under Indian purchases, public and private. In the case at hand, 
both the plaintiffs' predecessors and later the United States had secured 
Indian cessions of the disputed lands. Therefore both parties ultimately 
claimed by virtue of the same root of title. The only question was whether 
private individuals were competent to make such purchases. 26 
While it was thus unnecessary and speculative to discuss what sort of 
title the Indians held to their lands, the plaintiffs ventured the opinion that 
probably "their title by occupancy is to be respected, as much as that of an 
individual, obtained by the same right, in a civilized state''. 27 The fact that 
Indians held lands in common did not impair the strength of their title by 
occupancy. The plaintiffs referred to the Treaties of Utrecht and Aix la 
Chapelle as recognizing a right of soil in the Indians. At Utrecht in 1713, 
Britain and France agreed on the following Article: 
The inhabitants of Canada and other subjects of France shall hereafter 
give no molestation to the Five Nations or cantons of Indians subject to 
the dominion of Great Britain [i.e. the Iroquois nations], or to the other 
nations of America who are friends of the British Crown. In like manner, 
" The following discussion is based on the abbreviated account of counsel's 
arguments found in the law reports. Unfortunately no complete version of the 
pleadings of counsel appears to have survived, as an inquiry to the United States 
Supreme Court Library has confirmed. I am indebted to Prof. Balfour J. Halevy, 
Librarian of the Osgoode Hall Law School, for his generous assistance on this 
point. 
2
' 8 Wheaton 543 at 562-63. 
21 Ibid., at 563. 
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the subjects of Great Britain shall behave peaceably towards native 
Americans who are subjects or friends of France: and both groups shall 
enjoy full liberty of going and coming on account of trade .... 28 
This stipulation was confirmed in 1748 by the Treaty of Aix la Chapelle as 
part of a general renewal of the Utrecht provisions. 29 
While the Treaty does not recognize Indian land rights in explicit 
terms, it prohibits efforts on either side to dispossess Indians connected 
with the other party, which presumes Indian entitlement to their territories. 
The Treaty also distinguishes between lndians who are European subjects 
and those who are merely allies, thus apparently attributing an independent 
status to the latter. 
The plaintiffs went on to cite the remarks made by Chief Justice 
Marshall in the Supreme Court decision in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), 30 where, 
speaking for the majority, he said: 
It was doubted whether a state can be seized in fee oflands, subject to the 
Indian title, and whether a decision that they were seized in fee, might not 
be construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an 
ejectment for them, notwithstanding that title. 
The majority of the court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian 
title, which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately 
extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seizin in fee on 
the part of the state. 
The court recognizes Indian title as a legal right forming a burden on the 
underlying fee of the state; as such, it is entitled to respect by the courts un-
til extinguished. Marshall does not indicate whether that title might validly 
be alienated to a private individual. 
" My own translation of the original French text,. adapting the translation given in 
Charles Jenkinson, ed., A Collection of All the Treaties of Peace, Alliance, and 
Commerce, between Great-Britain and Other Powers ... (London: J. Debrett, 
1785), Vol. II, 5 at 36-37. The original French article reads as follows: "Les 
habitans du Canada et autres sujets de la France ne molesteront point a l'avenir 
!es Cinq Nations ou cantons des Indiens soumis a la Grande Bretagne, ny Jes 
autres nations de I' Amerique amies de eette eouronne. Pareillement Jes sujets de 
la Grande Bretagne se comporteront pacifiquement envers les Americains sujets 
ou amis de la France, et Jes uns et !es autres joiiiront d'une pleine liberte de se 
frequenter pour le bien de commerce, ... "; text in Frances G. Davenport, ed., 
European Treaties Bearing on the History of the United States and Its Dependen-
cies . .. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917-37), Ill, 
l93 at 213. As to the authority of the French text, see Clive Parry, ed., The Con-
solidated Treaty Series (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1969- ), 
XXVII, 475. 
2
• Article III: text in Parry, supra, note 28, XXXVIII, 297 at 305-06; Jenkinson, 
supra, note 28, 370 at 374. 
10 6 Cranch 87 at 142-43 (U .S.S.C.). 
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It is a matter of interest that Justice Johnson, in a strong separate 
opinion in the same case, denied that a state could be seized in fee simple of 
lands subject to Indian title. The right of the state in such an instance was 
"nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the 
country, to wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all com-
petitors within certain defined limits." 31 This amounted to a mere pre-
emptive right to acquire the fee simply by purchase when the Indian pro-
prietors were willing to sell. It may be noted that Johnson's view, while 
favourable to Indian title, was distinctly inamicable to the plaintiffs' claim, 
because it attributed to the government an exclusive power to extinguish 
Indian title, and thus implicitly ruled out private purchases. 
Counsel also referred to the decision of the New York Supreme Court 
in Jackson v. Wood (1810), 32 where Chancellor Kent observed: "It is a fact 
too notorious to admit of discussion or to require proof, that the Oneida In-
dians still reside within this state, as a distinct and independent tribe, and 
upon lands which they have never alienated, but hold and enjoy as the 
original proprietors of the soil." This conclusion was not affected by the 
fact, which Kent noted, that "indians generally hold their lands in common, 
and do not know of individual property in land." 
Having mounted these authorities favouring the existence of Indian 
title, the plaintiffs proceeded to·argue that this title could be transferred to 
private individuals, in the absence of any legislation to the contrary. At the 
time the conveyances in question were executed, they contended, there were 
no valid enactments in Virginia forbidding such transactions. Therefore the 
conveyances were good. To sustain this point, the plaintiffs had to 
distinguish several specific pieces of legislation, notably the Royal Proc-
lamation of 1763 and a Virginia statute of 1779. Their detailed submissions 
on this subject will be considered later. 
In reply, the defendants presented a comprehensive range of 
arguments, which attempt to cover all possible sources of law on the sub-
ject, including the law of nations, natural law, Indian custom, British 
colonial law, English land law, Virginia statutes, and Crown legislation. 
Invoking the law of nations, the defendants asserted that "the uniform 
understanding and practice of European nations, and the settled law, as laid 
down by the tribunals of civilized states, denied the right of the Indians to 
be considered as independent communities, having a permanent property in 
the soil, capable of alienation to private individuals." 13 The Indians, it was 
asserted, remained in a state of nature, and had never been admitted into 
the society of nations. Indeed the whole theory of European title to lands in 
America rested upon the hypothesis that the Indians had no right of soil as 
31 Ibid., at 147. 
32 7 Johnson's Reports 290 at 295 (N.Y.S.C.). 
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 567. 
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sovereign, independent states. "Discovery is the foundation of title in 
European nations, and this overlooks all proprietary rights in 'the 
natives. " 34 This argument, it may be noted, is similar to the doctrine of a 
legal vacuum, discussed earlier. 
The defendants also presented a parallel argument based on natural 
la~. By the law of nature, it was contended, the amount of land we can ac-
qmre by occupancy is limited by our capacity to use it to supply our wants. 
We cannot exclude other people from lands which they need and which we 
ourselves cannot use. "Upon this principle the North American Indians 
co~ld have acquired no proprietary interest in the vast tracts of territory 
which they wande~ed over; and their right to the lands on which they hunted 
c~m~d n?t .be cons1de~edi as superior to that which is acquired to the sea by 
f1shu~g m it. The use m the one case, as well as the other, is not exclusive. "JS 
In bnef, the lands occupied by the Indians were not used by them in such a 
ma~ner "as to prevent their being appropriated by a people of 
cult1vators."H 
This argument, it may be noted, combines two distinct lines of 
thought. The first asserts that we cannot arrogate for ourselves more land 
than_ we actuall.y need and make use of. This point, even if valid, is not 
particularly tellmg against Indian title as such, because there could be no 
doubt that the Indian~ made use of at least part of the land they claimed, 
and depended upon 1t for sustenance. At most the principle might be 
em~loyed to narrow the bounds of Indian territories, not to eliminate them 
e~ttrely. The second line of argument appears to assert something quite 
different, namely that cultivators of the soil are entitled to oust those who 
use the la1:1d only for h~nting and gathering. 37 This proposition raises age-
old and highly contentmus questions about the relative rights of farmers 
~e.rders~ hunters and miners. Although one might agree in the abstract that 
it ts desirable that land should be put to its most productive use, it seems ex-
treme to conclude that people who use land to less than its full potential 
thereby forfeit any title to it. 
The defendants went on to present an alternative agrument designed to 
meet these sorts of objections. They were prepared to accept, for the sake of 
argument, that the Indian nations constituted independent states and as 
such held ~itle to their territories. But if this were true, contended the de-
fen~ants, It followed that when the plaintiffs purchased land from the 
Indians, they took their title as Indian subjects and according to Indian con-
~epts of property. But the Indians never had any idea of individual property 
m land. Further, the lands conveyed to the plaintiffs were never severed 
3
• Ibid. , at 567. 
35 Ibid. , at 569-70. 
36 Ibid. , at 570. 
37 
Of .course as a matter of fact many North American Indian peoples practiced 
agriculture as well. 
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from Indian dominion, "because the grantees could not take the sovi:;reign-
ty and eminent domain to themselves. " 38 T~~refore, the ~efendants imply, 
the plaintiffs could stand in no higher a pos1Uon than ordn1:ary ?1embers of 
the tribe, whose particular right~ to use tribal lands were extmgmshed by the 
general cession made to the Umted States. 
A fourth argument presented by the defendant.s dr~ws upon b?th 
British colonial law and English common law as received m the colomes. 
The title of. the Crown to American territories, they contended, passe.d to 
the colonists by Royal Charters, which were ~bsolute grants ?f the soil. It 
was a "first principle in colonial law that all titles must be derived from the 
crown. "'9 By "colonial law", counsel see~ingly ?1eans ~he basic set of legal 
principles governing the colonies and their relatmns With the er.own. The 
reasoning is that the royal practice o~ gran~ing C:ha~t~rs to Amencan l.a~ds 
presupposed a legal principle preventmg private md1v1duals fr.om .obtammg 
lands in the colonies on their own account. The same conclusion is rea~he? 
by a slightly different route. Counsel noted that in mo~t of the colo~1es it 
was accepted that the settlers brought with them the nghts and duties of 
Englishmen, and particularly the laws of prope~ty,. so far as. these were 
suitable. English property law enshrined the pnnc1ple t.ha! title to land 
derives exclusively from the Crown. Therefore the plamtiffs could not 
derive title from the Indians. 40 • 
The argument, we may remark, recalls the. d?ctrine of common law dis-
possession considered earlier. Here, however, 1t ~s employed not so much to 
deny land rights to the Indians as to negate the nght.of a ~ettler to purchase 
land from the Indians, a point which has more ment. If mde~d the settlers 
are governed by English property law, as distinct from the Indians who ho~d 
land on a different basis, then it arguably follows that settlers can obtam 
title to property only by virtue of c:own grant: . 
Defendants also cited various pieces of legislation. ~s early ~s 1662, a 
Virginia Act forbade private land purchases from the lnd1~ns. T~is .st.atute, 
defendant observed had apparently never been repealed. A Virg1ma Act 
of 1779 states that' no person has or ever had a right to purchase lan~s 
within the limits of Virginia from any Indian nation except on the pubhc 
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 568. 
' 9 Ibid., at 570. 
•
0 Ibid., at 570-71. . 62 · l d "C 
• • The statute cited appears to be Act 138 of the session for I ~61- . , enllt e on-
cerning Indians". This provides that for the f~tur~ no Indian km~ or other shall 
upon any pretence alienate or sell, nor any Enghshman pur~hase, an!' tract ?f 
land justly claimed or actually possessed by any Indians, on pam of nulhty; text m 
William w. Hening, ed., The Statutes at Larife;. Being. a Collection of_ All th~ 
Laws of Virginia from . .. the Year 1619 (Facs1m1le repnnt, Charlotte~v1lle, Va .. 
University Press of Virginia, 1969; derived from 1st and 2nd eds., various places 
and publishers, 1819-23), II, 138 at 139. 
The Submissions of Counsel 23 
account, and that all such private purchases, past and future, are utterly 
void.42 The latter statute, it may be remarked, post-dated the two purchases 
in question here, which took place in 1773 and 1775. However the Act pur-
ports to govern past as well as future transactions. 
On this point, counsel for the other side contended that the Act of 1779 
could not affect rights already existing at the time of passage, invoking the 
Virginia constitution and general principles. Moreover the Act was appar-
ently repealed in 1794, not having been included in the revisal of that year. 
The repeal, they argued, reinstated any rights affected by the Act. As for 
the legislation of 1662, the plaintiffs asserted that the old Virginia Acts 
governing Indian purchases had all been repealed before the relevant 
period.• 3 
The defendants went on to refer to the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
which explicitly prohibited private persons from making any purchases of 
Indian lands in the American colonies. 44 Counsel for the other side con-
tended that the Proclamation was invalid in this respect, arguing that the 
Crown had no prerogative power to legislate for a colony once a local 
legislative assembly existed, as had long been the case in Virginia. 45 Since 
the Proclamation was a prerogative act and not an Act of Parliament, it was 
void in Virginia. The authority cited was the famous English decision in 
Campbell v. Hall (1774).46 Lord Mansfield held there that when the Crown 
acquiredl a territory by conquest or cession, it initially could legislate for the 
country under the prerogative, apart from Parliament; however this power 
was lost once a local assembly was granted to the colony. The defendants 
countered this reasoning with a pair of alternative arguments. •1 The ter-
ritory in question was acquired by the Crown either under the Treaty vf 
Paris in 1763, or at an earlier period when Virginia was founded. On the 
first premise, the Indian inhabitants of the territory fell under the Crown's 
sovereignty in 1763, as the inhabitants of a conquered and ceded country, 
and so, under the rule in Campbell v. Hall, the Crown could legislate for 
them under the prerogative. Insofar as the Proclamation restricted the right 
of Indians to sell their lands to settlers, it was valid because the Indians (if 
not the settlers) could be viewed as a conquered people. In the alternative, if 
the area in question was not gained by cession in 1763 but had always been 
part of the colony of Virginia, then the Proclamation was a valid exercise of 
the royal power to prescribe the limits within which grants of land and 
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 569; the 1779 statute is given at 565, note 5. 
" Ibid., at 565-66. Unfortunately no references are given for the supposed repealing 
legislation. 
•• Ibid. , at 57 l. 
" Ibid., at 564-65. 
•• I Cowp. 204; 98 E.R. 1045 (K.B.). 
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 571. 
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settlements could be made in a colony. This power entailed the authority to 
control private purchases of Indian lands. 48 
B. The Decision 
Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the unanimous op1mon of the 
Supreme Court, rejected the plaintiff's claim to der~v7 title from t.he 
Indians. Three distinct grounds were given for the dec1s1on. It was said, 
firstly, that the uniform practice of both Great Britain and the Uni~ed 
States, its successor, rested on the premise that the state had the exclus~ve 
power to grant title to lands in America. Such title was subject to the Indian 
right of occupancy· but the Indian right was extinguishable only by sur-
render to the state ~nd could not be transferred to private individuals. The 
second ground w~s somewhat different. It held that w.hatever ri~hts the 
plaintiffs acquired from the Indians were held under Indian prote~tton and 
subject to their laws. If the Indians chose to a~nul those nghts, ~o 
American court could interfere. The fact that the Indians ceded the lands m 
question to the United States without any reservation of the plaintiffs' 
rights indicated that they considered those rights invalid. The final reason 
given by the court was that private purchases of Indian lands were pro-
hibited by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, which was still in force when the 
transfers took place. 
1. The argument from uniform state practice 
Marshall begins by stating that the basic issue is whether th~ Indiai:is 
have the power to give to private individuals a title to land sustamable m 
American courts. 49 He emphasizes that the question is at root one of 
American law. rather than natural law or international law. Title to lands 
depends "entirely on the law of the nation in w~ic~ they lie". A co~rt, .he 
affirms, is bound to follow not simply those prmc1ples of abstract Justice 
which God has impressed on man's mind and which regulate the rights of 
civilized nations, but also and more particularly those rules "which our own 
government has adopted in the particular case, and given us as the rule for 
our decision". so Marshall acknowledges here a certain tension between 
domestic American law and principles of natural law and international law, 
and leaves no doubt as to which must prevail in American courts in case of 
conflict. This order of precedence is clearly indicated in a later passage, 
where Marshall observes that, however much a restriction on alienation of 
Indian lands "may be opposed to natural right, and to the usages of civi-
••For a detailed consideration of the validity of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
see Slattery, Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, supra, note 4, at 
283-302. 
•• 8 Wheaton 543 at 572. 
so Ibid. 
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lized nations", yet if it is indispensable to the system under which the 
country has been settled, it "certainly cannot be rejected by courts of 
justice" .s• Elsewhere he remarks: 
We will not enter into the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants, 
and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters 
fr~m the _territory they possess, or to contract their limits. Conquest gives 
a title which the courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private 
and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original 
justice of the claim which has been successfully asserted. ' 2 
The Chief Justice thus downplays the relevance of defendants' submissions 
on these points, and evidently makes every reservation as to their correct-
ness in point of principle. 
The governing law, then, is that of the United States. Marshall holds, 
however, that American law on this subject is founded on the law enforced 
by Great Britain in its American colonies prior to the Revolution. This in 
turn he characterizes as consonant with the rules originally recognized 
among ~uropean colonial powers as governing their behaviour in the New 
World. H~ thus begins his analysis with an historical survey of the practice 
of the major European powers, and then proceeds with an examination of 
British and finally American practice regarding Indian lands. 
From the early days of American discovery and exploration, relates 
Marshall, the great states of Europe were driven by a thirst for new terri-
tories. In order to avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, it was 
necessary for them to establish a principle which all should acknowledge as 
the law by which the right of acquisition should be regulated as among 
themselves. The principle which they adopted was this. Discovery of a 
country gave title against all other European governments, which title might 
be perf~c~ed by po~session. The discovering nation had the exclusive right 
of acqmrmg the soil from the native peoples and establishing settlements. 
No other European state might interfere.53 
This principle, Marshall indicates, was not part of the universal law of 
nations. It applied only among European states subscribing to it so as to 
reg~late their rights inter se. It could not in itself affect the rights of the 
native occupants of America. As Marshall explains in Worcester v. 
Georgia, 
it was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition 
a_mong those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the previous 
n?hts of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right given by 
discovery among the European discoverers, but could not affect the rights 
of those alrea~y in possession, either as aboriginal occupants, or as 
occupants by v1rtue of a discovery made before the memory of man.,. 
'' Ibid., at 591-92. 
" Ibid. , at 588. 
" Ibid., at 573. 
,. 6 Peters SIS at 544. 
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The Chief Justice was aware of the difficulty of applying the principle of 
discovery to lands which were already inhabited, and for that reason denies 
it the stature of a universal law among nations. He puts the matter this way: 
It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of either 
quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over 
the inhabitants of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the 
discovery of either by the other should give the discoverer rights in the 
country discovered which annulled the pre-existing rights of its ancient 
possessers." 
The significance of the principle of discovery, in Marshall's view, is the 
exclusivity of the rights which it conferred, the fact that the discovering 
European state had sole rights, as among European powers, of entering into 
relations with the natives of the country discovered, and of acquiring land 
from them. He seems to imply that this exclusive right of acquisition 
operated not only as against other European states but also as against the 
subjects of the discovering state, so that the Crown or government alone 
could purchase Indian title, and not private individuals - a point of ob-
vious relevance to the issue before the court. 
It is important to note that according to the Chief Justice the principle 
of discovery said nothing as to how the incoming European state should 
deal with the native inhabitants. How far the Indians were to retain their 
original independence, governmental structures, customary laws and land 
rights would depend on the links actually established between a European 
state and particular Indian nations. "Those relations which were to exist 
between the discoverer and the natives, were to be regulated by 
themselves". 56 It follows that the nature of such relationships might be ex-
pected to vary somewhat from European state to European state, and 
perhaps from one Indian nation to another. 
Nevertheless Marshall hazards a generalization about European state 
practice as a whole, which is worth quoting at length: 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original in-
habitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, 
to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful 
occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain possession 
of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to 
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily dimin-
ished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whom-
soever they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle that 
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it. 
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the 
natives, as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion to be in 
" Ibid., at 542-43. 
,. 8 Wheaton 543 at 573. 
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then:s~lves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate 
donumon, a power to grant the soil, while yet in possession of the natives. 
The.se grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees 
sub1ect only to the Indian right of occupancy." ' 
The crucia~ proposition to note here, if we are to understand Marshall's 
argume~t, ~s that the ~uropean powers generally claimed the right to grant 
lands w1thm t?e terntories discovered, even while the Indians were in 
factual possess10n, and before any cession or surrender had been secured 
fror;i the.m. Such grants, he states, were thought to convey title subject to an 
Indian nght of occupancy. 
Mars~~ll contends that the history of North America proves the univer-
sal recogm~10n of these principles among the colonizing states, and he goes 
on to review the , st.ate practice of Spain, Portugal, France, Holland, 
England an~ t~e Umted States. The evidence adduced regarding the first 
fo~: countn~s IS. meagre,. and it appe~rs that Marshall draws mainly on 
Bn~1sh practice m Amenca, as reaffirmed and carried forward by the 
~mted States .. 58 This observation applies less, perhaps, to the principle of 
discovery, ~hich rests upon the supposed unanimous recognition of Euro-
pea~ colomal powers, than to the legal relations established between an in-
comm~ Europ_ea~ sovereign and native Americans. It seems fair to say that 
the C~1ef J usttc.e. s analysis of the latter subject is based largely on his inter-
pr~tat1on of British and United States law and practice, and owes little to 
evidence drawn from the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French colonies 
.. Marshall revie":'s some of the major American charters issued by th~ 
Bnt1sh Cro"'.n, rangmg from the Commission granted to the Cabots in 1496 
to t~e Carohna Charters of the 1660's. He draws from this survey the con-
clu~1on ~h~t the whole country has, in stages, been granted by the Crown 
whde still m the possession of the Indians. The grants, he notes, generally 
purport to convey not only the right of dominion but also the soil itself. In 
a~l of the areas affected, the ~and ~a~ at the time of grant occupied by In-
dians. Yet ali_n?st every land title w1thm those areas derives in some manner 
from the ong11!al Crown grants. It has never been objected, Marshall 
observes, that title as wel~ as possession was in the Indians, and that the 
Crown ~rants passed no~~mg on that account. The various Charters cannot 
be considered mere nulhttes. 59 
.Under the treaty which concluded the Revolutionary War, Marshall 
co?ti?ues, the governmel?tal powers and title to the soil formerly vested in 
~ntam passe~ to the United States. It has not hitherto been doubted that 
either t~e ~mted St~tes .or the individual states had a clear title to all the 
lands w1thm the terntones tra~sferred, subject only to the Indian right of 
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right was vested 
" Ibid., at 574. 
" Ibid., at 574-87. 
,. Ibid., at 579-80. 
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in the government. 60 The Chief Justice reviews certa~n historical e~ide.nce 
supporting this observation and concludes that the Umted St~tes ~amtams, 
as did the colonial powers, "that discovery gave an exclusive nght to ex-
tinguish the Indian title of occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; 
and gave also a right to such a degree of sovereignty as the circumstances of 
the people would allow them to exercise". 6 ' 
Marshall now comes to the nub of his argument. The validity of the 
land titles conferred by the British Crown and its successor, the United 
States, had never been questioned in the courts. The power to grant title has 
been exercised uniformly over territory in Indian possession. ''The existence 
of this power'', he concludes, "must negative the existence of any right 
which may conflict with, and control it. An absolute tit!e t~ lands 
cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or m. different 
governments .... All our institutions recognize the absolute titl~ of the 
crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy; and recognized the 
absolute title of the crown to extinguish that right. This is incompatible with 
an absolute and complete title in the Indians. " 62 
The Chief Justice holds in effect that the notion that private parties can 
acquire title by direct purchase from the Indians is irreconcilable with the 
uniform claims of the British Crown and the United States to exclusive 
powers of disposition over American lands. These powers rest on the princi-
ple that, so far as settlers are concerned, the Crown is the sole so?rce .of 
title and so far as Indians are concerned, the Crown alone can extmgmsh 
thei; right of occupancy. On either count, the claim of the plaintiffs fails. 
2. The argument from Indian jurisdiction 
We will now consider a second and quite distinct line of reasoning 
which is advanced by the court. Marshall frames this argument as follows: 
The title of the crown, whatever it might be, could be acquired only by a 
conveyance from the crown. If an individual might extinguish the Indian 
title for his own benefit, or, in other words, might purchase it, still he 
could acquire only that title. Admitting their [the Indians'] power to 
change their laws or usages, so far as to allow an individual to separate a 
portion of their lands from the common stock, and hold it in se~eralty, 
still it is a part of their territory, and is held under them, by a title de-
pendent on their laws. The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if 
they choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the 
courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. 
The person who purchases lands frOJll the Indians, within their territory, 
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; 
holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws. If they 
•• Ibid., at 584-85. 
" Ibid., at 587. 
•
2 Ibid., at 588. 
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annul the grant, we know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the 
proceeding.• 3 
. In the present instance, relates Marshall, war broke out between 'the 
Umted States and the Indian nations after the private conveyances had been 
e.ffected. Treaties were later concluded whereby the Indians ceded their en-
t~re country to the United States without any reservation of the plaintiffs' 
title. The absence of such a reservation, coupled with the fact that the In-
dians had continued to use the deeded lands in common with their other 
lands, suggests that the Indians did not consider the conveyances valid. 04 
The question arises how far this argument is compatible with 
Marshall's first argument, or intended to be. On one view the two 
a.rguments are logicaJly inconsistent, and are presented as alternatives. The 
f1:st argume~t treats the Crown as ultimate sovereign and owner of the soil, 
with the Indians .holding a right of occupancy. The second, by contrast, 
accords the Indians an autonomous or quasi-independent status and 
recognizes their sovereign ability to dispose of their lands according to their 
own laws. 
Despit~ these differences, it appears the arguments can be reconciled. 
The court m effect recognizes that the situation under consideration is 
governe~ simultan.eously by two distinct legal regimes, Anglo-American 
and Indian. The first argument approaches the question from within the 
~ontext of Anglo-~~erican law. It maintains that the land system operating 
m s~ttler commumt1es rests on the premise that the Crown is the sole source 
of title, so that settlers are incapable of deriving from the Indians a title to 
land recognizable in American law. However, this reasoning does not ex-
ten~ to ~he Indians, whose title to the soil by occupancy, and whose trans-
actions .mte~ se are not affected. Enter the second argument, which looks to 
the Indian side of the matter. It holds that the rules in force in settler com-
mu~ities do n~t d~rcctly apply to Indian peoples living independent lives in 
their own terntones under their own laws. Just as an Indian nation may 
~resumedly confer ex~lusive land rights on particular members of the group 
(tf ~he la~s of the nation allow this), so also it is conceivable that an Indian 
nat10n might grant land to individual outsiders. In such a case, maintains 
the court, the outsider assimilates himself with the Indians and holds his 
lands subject to their authority and under their laws. If the' Indians subse-
quently su~ren?er their lands to .the government so as to extinguish not only 
the collective title of the gr?up itself, but also any particular rights held by 
group i:nembers, then the nghts of the outsider are nullified as well, for he 
stands m no higher a position than any other member of the group. 
•• Ibid., at 593. 
•• Ibid., at 593-94. 
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3. The argument from the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
The final reason given by the court for rejecting the plaintiff's claim is 
the most straightforward of the three presented. As seen earlier, in October 
1763 the British Crown issued a Proclamation governing its North 
American dominions, which among other things reserves certain lands west 
of the Atlantic watershed for Indian use, and explicitly prohibits private 
persons from purchasing Indian lands. The Proclamation applied to the 
lands in dispute and was still in force in 1773 and 1775 when the purchases 
were effected. If it was valid and binding, then those purchases were void. 
The plaintiffs sought to avoid this conclusion by contending that the Crown 
did not have the power, in its prerogative, to forbid such transactions. Mar-
shall rejected this argument and upheld the Proclamation. 
He notes firstly that under British constitutional law all vacant lands 
within the realm are vested in the Crown, which has the power to grant them 
under the royal prerogative. This same principle was applied in America, 
with the difference that while title was admitted to lie with the Crown, the 
Indians were recognized to hold rights of occupancy. "The lands, then, to 
which this proclamation referred, were lands which the King had a right to 
grant, or to reserve for the Indians. " 65 
The second justification furnished for the Proclamation has con-
siderable theoretical interest. The British Crown, notes Marshall, holds ex-
tensive prerogative powers under the constitution regarding political rela-
tions with foreign nations, notably the authority to make war and peace and 
to conclude treaties. He refers to the anomalous situation of the American 
Indians, "necessarily considered in some respects, as a dependent, and in 
some respects as a distinct people, occupying a country claimed by Great 
Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable 
enemies ... ''. 66 In short, the Indians were in some respects subject nations 
(at least in theory), and in other respects sovereign or quasi-sovereign en-
tities. To the extent that the Indians preserved their distinct status, implies 
Marshall, the Crown retained toward them certain of the powers held vis-a-
vis foreign nations, in particular the power to secure Indian friendship by 
restraining the encroachment of whites on their lands. The Crown's 
authority to do this, affirms the court, was never denied by the colonies, 
and the Proclamation's provisions are valid as an exercise of that 
authority.67 
6
' Ibid .. , at 596. 
66 Ibid. 
•
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The Legal Character and Scope of Indian Title 31 
C. The Legal Character and Scope of Indian Title 
. W~at the.n is the precise legal nature of the Indian right of occupancy, 
m particu~ar its relations~ip to the underlying title vested in the Crown? 
From ;anous refer:nces it may be inferred that Marshall envisages four 
st(.lges ii: the e~olut1on of the Crown's rights to Indian lands. The initial 
sta~e ex1ste~ pnor !o the European discovery of North America, when the 
v~10us !nd1an nations and bands were sovereign and independent units 
with theu own laws and political structures, possessing full dominion over 
the lands which they occupied. Marshall does not subscribe to the theory 
that N.orth America, upon European discovery, was terra nullius, land 
belonging to no one. As he states in Worcester v. Georgia: 
~m~rica, separat7~ from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a 
d1stmct people, d!Vlded into separate nations, independent of each other 
~nd of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and govern. 
mg themselves by their own laws. 61 
He remarks that it is difficult to understand how the inhabitants of Europe 
could.have had rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants of 
Amen~a or the lands they occupied, intimating that both dominion and title 
were, m the pre-European era at least, vested in native Americans. 
The sec~:>nd stage arises, acc.ording to Marshall, upon the European 
voyage~ of discovery and exploration. Under a principle quickly adopted by 
the :naJ~r Europ~an powers, the state first discovering a country held ex-
clu~1ve .nght~ agamst other European states to enter into relations with the 
native mhab1~ants of.th~ country.' and to gain the soil by whatever means 
were appropriate. This right of discovery was held against other European 
s~ates but n~t the Indian peoples, who had not subscribed to it, and whose 
ng.h~s were m no way affected. Acting under the right of discovery the 
Bnt1sh Crown ~nd the other colonizing powers issued Charters confe;ring 
go.vernmental nghts a~d title.to the soil to various groups and individuals, 
pnor to actual pos.sess1on be~ng taken of the lands in question, and while 
those lands were sttll held by mdependent Indian groups. The Charters had 
force as ~etwe~~ the Crown and its grantees, and conferred rights en-
forcea~Ie m Bntish courts against other British subjects. They also took 
effect, m theory, vis-a-vis other European states (at least to the extent that 
they were ba~ked by a right of discovery), but no method for securing en-
forc~ment existed beyond diplomatic negotiations or war. Marshall appears 
to thmk that the Charters had no effect as regards the Indians at this stage 
because the <:rown c~uld grant no more than it possessed. and thus far i~ 
held on!y ~ ng~t of discovery good against other European nations. 
. This situation changed as the Crown, its agents and grantees, graduauy 
gamed a measure of control over Indian nations encountered in the course 
•• 6 Peters 515 at 542. 
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of settlement and trade. This control was secured by force of arms or treaty, 
and Indian peoples generally became dependent nations living under the 
Crown's overall sovereignty. This third stage in the process gave the Crown 
rights which were directly enforceable against the Indians, and correspond-
ingly affected Indian sovereignty and land rights. The move from the 
second to the third stage Marshall views as the conversion of a right of 
discovery into a right of conquest, 69 or as he puts it elsewhere, the transfor-
mation of a merely dormant right against the native peoples into an actual 
one. 10 
The Crown at this third stage held what Marshall describes as a "com-
plete ultimate title" to the soil, subject to an Indian right of possession 
which the Crown alone could acquire. 11 The Crown's title originated, on 
Marshall's view, with the right of discovery, but at that point it was held ex-
clusively vis-a-vis other European states; the title became operative against 
Indian nations only when they became subject to the Crown's overall 
sovereignty. 
What, then, is the legal character of Indian land rights at stage three? 
Clearly native title is capable of coexisting with the ultimate title of the 
Crown, upon which it forms a burden. Moreover it is a title cognizable by 
the courts,. that is a "legal" right, and not one dependent merely on policy 
or considerations of justice. The Indians, affirms Marshall, •'were admitted 
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to 
retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion"; 
nevertheless their power to dispose of it freely was now limited to a right of 
alienation to the Crown. 72 Earlier, in Fletcher v. Peck (1810), the Chief 
Justice had stated that the Indian title "is certainly to be respected by all 
courts, until it be legitimately extinguished", but is "not such as to be ab-
solutely repugnant to seizin in fee on the part of the state". 73 Marshall re-
affirms that view in Johnson v. M'Intosh, and he goes on to comment that 
the Indian right of occupancy "is no more incompatible with a seisin in fee 
than a lease for years, and might as effectually bar an ejectment". 74 The In-
dian title is not only cognizable by the courts, but enforceable against a par-
ty claiming under the Crown's ultimate title. The reason is that grants from 
the Crown "convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of 
occupancy. " 75 So long as the right of occupancy exists, the Indians have full 
beneficial use of the land, the right "to use it according to their own discre-
tion''. 1 • 
•• 8 Wheaton 543 at 591. 
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Marshal! dis:usses the overall position of Indian nations in stage three 
at several pomts m Worcester v. Georgia. He states, in a famous passage, 
tha! .the Indian nations had always been viewed as "distinct, independent 
P?htlcal communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the un-
disput7d possessors of the soil from time immemorial'', with the exception 
of the imposed restriction against relations with any European nation other 
than the first discoverer .17 He asserts that history furnishes no example 
from the time of first settlement, of any attempt on the Crown's part to in~ 
terfere ~ith the internal affairs of the Indians, except to keep out the agents 
of foreign powers. 78 The typical Indian group in contact with the British, 
nevertheless, became over time dependent on the Crown for the supply of 
necessary goods, and for protection from lawless intrusions into its 
country. H These and other factors operated so as to bind that nation to the 
Crown as "a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend 
and .neighbor, and receiving the advantages of that protection, without in-
volvmg a surrender of their national character". so Marshall notes that 
u_nder the law of nations a weaker power does not necessarily surrender its 
right of self-government by taking the protection of a stronger state and he 
cites Vattel on the point. 81 The status of Indian nations within th~ United 
States can be described, states Marshall in a related case, as that of 
"domes~ic dependent nations". 82 While retaining internal autonomy, they 
are considered both by the United States and by foreign states as being "so 
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States that 
any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connectiod with 
them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act 
of hostility". 83 ' 
The fourth and final stage in the process occurs when the Indians' right 
?f occupancy is e~tinguished in favour of the state. This may occur, accord-
ing to Marshall, either by surrender under treaty or by forcible confiscation 
a~d eviction in the course of war. The Chief Justice expresses differing 
views as to which mode predominated in the past. In Johnson v. M'lntosh, 
he suggests that "frequent and bloody wars" and the inexorable advance-
ment of white settlement forced the Indians to retreat into the interior and 
abandon their original lands, which were then parcelled out by the sovereign 
power.s• His assessment seems to change somewhat in Worcester v. 
Georgia, where he affirms that the King purchased the lands of the Indians, 
11 6 Peters 515 at 559. 
" Ibid., at 547. 
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when they were willing to sell, at a price they were willing to accep!, "but 
never coerced a surrender of them" .. 85 Allowing for overstatement m each 
instance it seems fair to say that the Chief Justice envisaged both processes 
as occur~ing at different times and places. The result in either case is simil~r. 
The lands are freed of the Indian interest, which passes to the Crown or its 
grantees. . . . 
We may now return to the series of questions posed earhe~ ~egar~mg 
the impact of the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty upon abongmal title, 
and the effects of the introduction of English land law. How does Marshall 
go about reconciling Indian land rights with the f~udal h~erarchy envi~aged 
by English law? The scheme envisaged by the Chief Justice as operatmg at 
stage three is as follows. The Crown is recognized as feudal .overl?rd o~ In-
dian lands and holder of the ultimate title. So long as Indian title exists, 
the Crowd's title is very limited in scope. Clearly, it entails an exclusive 
power to extinguish Indian title by purchase or cessio~. Marshall also 
recognizes that the Crown has the power to grant lands which are burdene? 
by aboriginal title. In this case, .however, the .crown grants ?O m.ore than It 
possesses itself, namely the ultimate fee subJect to the Indian ng?t or oc-
cupancy .. So the grantee takes subject to native title, and only ~btam~ nghts 
of use and occupancy when that title is extinguished. The Indians' n~ht of 
occupancy imports full rights to use and exploit the resources of the.soil, the 
right "to use it according to their own discretion'', 8 ~ although t~eir power 
to alienate it to non-natives is now limited to a nght of cess10n to the 
Crown. The right of occupancy is not limited to "traditional" uses of the 
land. There would be no apparent obstacle to a band of hunters turning to 
farming, to raising cattle, or indeed to enga~ing in mining o_r .luill:bering. 
The point is that the Crown's underlying title imports no.b~nef1~1al ~1ghts of 
use unless or until the Indian title is extinguished. Abongmal title is thus a 
uniform title, which does not vary from people to people. 
If Indian lands cannot be sold to private individuals in the settler com-
munity the question arises whether they can be transferred among native 
groups' themselves, whether by formal transactions, o~ by infor~a~ pro-
cesses involving the migration of peoples and the mergmg and sphttmg of 
bands. Chief Justice Marshall does not specifically address this question. 
The logic of his argument suggests, however, that the exclusive right of the 
Crown to extinguish Indian title is a right held as against other European 
states and their subjects, as well as incoming settlers, subjects of the Crown. 
It does not affect the fluid indigenous scheme of things, or limit the 
possibility of lands passing from one native group to another. The questi?n 
of which Indian nation held title to a given area would not normally anse 
until land surrenders are taken, in which case the Indian group actually in 
"6 Peters 515 at 547. 
•• 8 Wheaton 543 at 574. 
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possession would prima facie be accepted as the title-holder, regardless of 
whether their possession was from "time immemorial" or the result of 
more recent events. 81 Any other view wo.uld appear to render the surrender 
process unworkable. 
D. The Legal Basis of the Theory 
One point emerges clearly from the judgment. The principles which the 
court lays down derive largely from British law, and in particular from that 
branch of the common law which governs the relations between Great Bri-
tain and its overseas possessions and provides the basic constitutional 
framework for the colonies, - what is known as "colonial law". 88 The 
legal status of Indian lands is determined by reference to Crown and 
governmental practice in the American colonies, practice which is perceived 
to reflect certain underlying legal principles. These principles are of a 
general character and thus would apply prima f acie to all British colonies in 
North America, including those now forming part of Canada. They might 
also apply to British colonies in other parts of the world where similar con-
ditions prevailed, such as the colonies in New Zealand and Australia. 
It has been suggested, to the contrary, that the law applied by Chief 
Justice Marshall is not English common law or colonial law, but rather the 
law of Virginia as it had developed from the time of the first English settle-
ment. Virginia law, it is argued, although perhaps originally based on the 
common law, evolved in a distinctive manner, notably in its treatment of In-
dian land rights. 89 On this interpretation, the rules set out in Johnson v. 
M'Intosh would not necessarily apply to other British colonies, even in 
North America, much less farther afield. 
The main difficulty with this view is that it derives little support from 
the judgment itself. The court makes only brief references to Virginia law, 
and then only to illustrate the general legal norms governing Indian lands 
throughout British territories. Those norms are not presented as deriving 
their universality from a purely accidental coincidence between the laws of 
each particular American colony. Rather they are thought to apply as a 
matter of principle in all the American colonies, except to the extent that 
they have been modified by competent authority in any individual colony. 
This point is illustrated by the court's remarks regarding a Virginia Act 
of 1779, considered earlier, which declares that the government has an ex-
clusive right of pre-emption over Indian lands, and provides that private 
"For a different view, see, e.g., Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development, [1980]! I F.C. 518 at 557-58, 562 (F.C.T.D.). 
" See, e.g., Charles Clark, A Summary of Colonial Law (London: 1834). The stan-
dard modern authority is Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial 
Law (Londlon: 1966). 
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purchases are void. 90 Marshall observes that the Act "may safely be con-
sidered as a unequivocal affirmance, on the part of Virginia, of the broad 
principle which had always been maintained that the exclusive right to pur-
chase from the Indians resided in the government". 9 ' This "broad princi-
ple" is thought to apply in the absence of particular legislation to the con-
trary. Its source, I suggest, is colonial law. 
One must take care not to confuse colonial law, which is a body of 
largely common law principles applying to British colonies generally, with 
the substantive common law received in a particular colony. Colonial law 
takes effect as regards a colony regardless of whether English common law 
is ever introduced there. Thus it applied both to the colony of Quebec, 
where French law was retained in most matters, and to the colony of 
Massachusetts, where English common law was received. 
The tendency to confound colonial law with the common law received 
in a given colony is illustrated by an argument considered in the Australian 
case of Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. (1971). 92 The argument holds that it 
was impossible for a common law doctrine recognizing native title to exist in 
the colony of New South Wales, because in 1788, when the common law 
was received there, no such doctrine could have existed in England, as there 
were no aboriginals in England to whom it could apply. 93 If this approach 
were correct, it would be equally impossible for English common law to 
harbour rules governing the status of colonies, because there were no col-
onies within England to which they could apply. Such reasoning, or course, 
ignores the fact that a distinct branch of the common law developed from at 
least the seventeenth century onwards which governed the basic position of 
British overseas possessions and their inhabitants, law derived principally 
from the practice of the Crown, as recognized by judicial decision. 94 It is 
this body of law which the court in Johnson v. M'Intosh applies. 
E. Critique 
The doctrine elaborated by Chief Justice Marshall represents perhaps 
the most sustained and convincing judicial effort yet made to explain what 
happened when the disparate legal worlds of Europe and aboriginal 
America met and clashed!. In its grasp of the issues, sense of history, and 
relative sensitivity to the Indian outlook, the doctrine has few rivals. This is 
not to say it is exempt from criticism. 
The principle of discovery is a case in point. The Chief Justice asserts 
that European colonizing powers agreed at an early stage that the first state 
•• See text above at note 42. 
" 8 Wheaton 543 at 585. 
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!o discover a~ are~ of the New World had the exclusive right to appropriate 
It. Modern h1stoncal scholars have been less certain on this point. 95 It is 
known, for example, that both Fran\:ois I of France and Elizabeth I of 
Eng!and. thre~ cold water on the contention that discovery conferred ex-
clusive rights m the New World; such a principle was perceived as unduly 
favourable to the pioneers in the field, Spain and Portugal. 96 While it is true 
that the diplomatic armouries of most European colonial powers were 
stocked with voyages of discovery (genuine or apocryphal) for use as can-
non fodder in backing American claims, it is more difficult to find instances 
where a discovery by one state was recognized by rival powers as sufficient 
to bar them from the field. In other words, it remains doubtful how far 
European colonial powers subscribed to the principle of discovery when it 
was seen to operate against them, rather than in their favour. 
.Even accepting, for the sake of argument, that some such principle was 
adm1tte~ among European states, it is unclear whether the principle 
necessarily ruled out purchases of Indian lands by private individuals. There 
is a distinction between the acquisition of territorial title in the international 
law. sense, .and the purchase of private title to lands. Even if we suppose that 
a d1scovenng state gained an exclusive right against other European states 
to appropriate the region discovered and thereby gain territorial title it does 
not necessarily follow that a subject of the discovering sovereign c~uld not 
purchase private title from the native peoples and hold it under the 
sovereignty of the incoming monarch. Clearly a subject could not under 
the principle, obtain international title to any portion of the discove~ed ter-
ritory and set himself up as an independent potentate. But why could he not 
secure a private title? The answer must lie, not in the principle of discovery 
b~t in the domestic law of the European state concerned. If that la~ 
st1p~lat~s that t~e sove~e~g.n is the sole source of private title for subjects 
settlmg m colonial acqms1t1ons, then private purchases from native peoples 
are ruled out. Otherwise they would appear to be permissible. 
., For a variety of views, see Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Island<; 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), 47-119; Myres S. McDougal, Harold 
D. Lass~ell, .and Ivan A. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (New Haven: 
Yale Umvers1ty Press, 1963), 830-44; Brian Slattery, "French Claims in North 
Amenc~, 1500-59',', supra, _note 4; Friedrich A. von der Heydte, "Discovery, 
Symb?hc Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in International Law" (] 935), 29 
Amen~a'! Journal of International Law 448-71. The work by A. S. Keller, 
0 .J_. L1ss1tzyn, and F .J. Mann, Creation of Rights of Sovereignty through Sym-
b<!hc Acts! 1400-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938) must be used 
with caut10n: the authors tend to force their interpretations of historical events 
and to ignore conflicting evidence in an effort to sustain their thesis. 
06 
For Fran~ois I, see Slattery, "French Claims in North America, 1500-59", supra, 
note 4, esp. at 161-64; for Elizabeth I, see Goebel, supra, note 95, at 63. 
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These reflections reinforce the view that Marshall's theory rests 
ultimately upon his understanding of British colonial law and practice, as 
inherited and reaffirmed by the United States. His first argument, in par-
ticular, boils down to the proposition that, from the time of the early 
Charters, the British Crown consistently claimed the exclusive power to deal 
with Indian lands over which it asserted sovereignty, and sole authority to 
extinguish Indian title by purchase or (in the case of war) by forcible ap-
propriation. This claim, assuming that it was lawful under British law, un-
mistakably ruled out private purchases of Indian lands as a source of title 
maintainable against the Crown. So far as non-Indian subjects were con-
cerned, the Crown was the exclusive source of title. 
I have emphasized here the degree to which Chief Justice Marshall 
draws upon original British practice in America. As such, his theory 
transcends its immediate American context, as an exposition of the earliest 
principles of British colonial law governing relations between the Crown 
and aboriginal peoples. The theory has considerable significance for 
Canada, and also for such Commonwealth nations as New Zealand and 
Australia. 
It is interesting, therefore, to compare Marshall's view of aboriginal 
title with a doctrine expounded at a slightly later period in the fledgling 
colony of New Zealand, which was confronted with problems similar to 
those arising in America. 
VII. THE DOCTRINE OF ABORIGINAL TITLE 
(R. v. SYMONDS) 
The Queen (on the prosecution of C. H. Mcintosh) v. Symonds is a 
case decided by the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 1847, during the 
early days of the colony.97 The claimant, Mcintosh, petitioned the court to 
annul a Crown grant made to the defendant, Symonds, asserting prior title 
to the same land by purchase from the Maori people, the original in-
habitants of the islands. Mcintosh had bought the land after securing from 
the colonial Governor a certificate waiving in his favour the Crown's ex-
clusive right of pre-emption regarding native lands. The court ruled 
unanimously against Mcintosh, holding that a private purchase of Maori 
land could not give title, and that the Governor's certificate did not validate 
the purchase. Two opinions were written in the case, one by Justice Chap-
man, the other by Chief Justice Martin. I will review them separately. 
A. Chapman's Opinion 
Justice Chapman bases his judgment on the law and practice of Great 
Britain and its colonial offshoots, including the United States. He explains 
this in a significant passage: 
The intercourse of civilized nations, and especially of Great Britain, with 
the aboriginal Natives of America and other countries, during the last two 
centuries, has gradually led to the adoption and affirmation by the Colo-
nial Courts of certain established principles of law applicable to such in-
tercourse. Although these principles may at times have been lost sight of, 
yet animated by the humane spirit of modern times, our colonial Courts, 
and the Courts of such of the United States of America as have adopted 
the common law of England, have invariably affirmed and supported 
them; so that at this day, a line of judicial decision, the current of legal 
opinion, and above all, the settled practice of the colonial Governments, 
have concurred to clothe with certainty and precision what would other-
wise have remained vague and unsettled. These principles are not the new 
creation or invention of the colonial Courts. They flow not from what an 
American writer has caUed the "vice of judicial legislation." They are in 
fact to be found among the earliest settled principles of our law; and they 
97 [1840-1932] N.Z.P.C.C. 387 (N.Z.S.C.). 
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are in part deduced from those higher principles, from charters made in 
conformity with them, acquiesced in even down to the charter of our own 
Colony; and from the letter of treaties with Native tribes, wherein those 
principles have been asserted and acted upon.•• 
Chapman affirms here that relations between the Cro~n and the.na.tive in-
habitants of British colonies are governed, at least partially, by prmciples of 
law, and not merely by policy and expedien~y. Th~se pri~cipl.es form part 
of a larger set of rules governing the colomes, which ~enve m tu:n from 
basic precepts of the common law proper and the established colomal prac-
tice of the Crown, as recognized and affirmed by the courts. 
It is a fundamental maxim of the common law, argues Chapman, that 
the King is the original proprietor of all lands within th~ realm and the s~le 
source of private title. This principle has been imported mto all the colomes 
settled by Britain. Colonial courts have invariably ?eld, su~j~ct to rules of 
prescription, that they can only give effect to titles denvmg from t~e 
Crown verified by letters patent. It seems to follow from the same basic 
maxim: continues Chapman, that no British subj.eel can acquire new lands 
for himself. Any acquisition of territory by a sub1ect, whether by conquest, 
discovery, occupation, or purchase from native tri~es, operates to the 
benefit of the Crown, and confers no rights on the sub1ect. In short, Chap-
man concludes the Crown enjoys the exclusive right of acquiring new ter-
ritory and exti~guishing the title of the native inhabitants. It follows that 
the title asserted by the claimant is void, as founded upon a purchase from 
the natives and a certificate from the Governor, neither amounting to letters 
patent under the seal of the colony. 99 • • 
Chapman goes on to discuss the natur~ of. n~tlve Ja.nd :1ghts. ri:e 
observes that the governmental practice of extmgmshmg native title by fair 
purchase is over two centuries old. It has long been adopted by the govern-
ments of the British colonies in America, and by the United States. "It is 
now", he concludes, "part of the law of the land, and altho~gh the Courts 
of the United States, in suits between their own subjects, will not allow a 
grant to be impeached under pretext that t~e Native titl~ has n.ot been ex-
tinguished, yet they would certainly not hesitate to do soma smt by one of 
the Native Indians." 100 Native title is entitled to be respected, and "cannot 
be extinguished (at least in times of peace) otherwise than by free consent of 
the Native occupiers". 101 • • • 
Like Marshall, then, Chapman holds that native title constitute~ a legal 
right which is cognizable by the courts and entitled to their protection; the 
right coexists with the Crown's title,1.mtil extinguished by s?r~ender. He 
does not define the title more exactly, save to say that the restnct1on on free 
•• Ibid., at 388. 
•• Ibid., at 388-90. 
100 Ibid., at 390. 
101 Ibid. 
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alienation to Europeans necessarily renders it somewhat inferior to an estate 
in fee. However he notes that in practice native title is ample enough to 
secure full enjoyment of the land, and allows the native people to deal as 
freely with the land among themselves as they did prior to the coming of 
Europeans. 102 Chapman implies that indigenous systems of land tenure con-
tinued in force after the Crown's advent, at least for the internal purposes 
of the native communities. Settlers, by contrast, were governed by English 
law, and in particular by the rule that the Crown is the exclusive source of 
title. Consequently they could obtain Jands only by Crown grant, not by 
purchase directly from the native people. Before native lands entered the 
governmental land system and became available for disposal by the Crown, 
native title had first to be extinguished, normally by voluntary cession. The 
resulting duality of land tenure systems is reflected in Chapman's remark 
that private purchases by Europeans of native lands are not in fact absolute-
ly null and void. "If care be taken to purchase off the true owners, and to 
get in all outstanding claims, the purchases are good as against the Native 
seller, but not against the Crown." 103 
Justice Chapman does not attempt to characterize precisely the nature 
of the Crown's interest in unsurrendered native lands. He canvasses various 
possibilities, ranging from a full seisin in fee held by the Crown against 
everyone except the natives, to a mere right of pre-emption. While not 
reaching any definite conclusion, he seems to favour the latter view. He 
observes that although the Stuart kings clearly assumed the fee to be in the 
Crown, as evidenced by the American Charters of the seventeenth century, 
it had not been the practice for more than a century, either in the British 
colonies in America or subsequently in the United States, to permit any pa-
tent to pass the public seal previous to the extinguishment of the native 
title. 10• 
B. Martin's Opinion 
The theory adopted by the second judge in the case, Chief Justice 
Martin, is akin to that espoused by Chapman. He states that, under British 
colonial law, English subjects who appropriated unoccupied lands in an 
overseas territory to which England held prior title as against other Euro-
pean nations did not thereby acquire any legal right to the soil as against the 
Crown. This principle, he maintains, applied with equal force whether the 
'
0
' "The legal doctrine as to the exclusive right of the Queen to extinguish the Native 
title ... [leaves] the Natives to deal among themselves, as freely as before the 
commencement of our intercourse with them .... Technically, it contemplates 
the Native dominion over the soil as inferior to what we call an estate in fee: prac-
tically, it secures to them all the enjoyments from the land which they had before 
our intercourse . . . "; ibid., at 39 l. 
10
' Ibid., at 390. 
'
04 Ibid., at 391-92. 
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country was already partially populated or completely uninhabited, and 
whether the settlers obtained lands with or without the consent of the 
original inhabitants. Accordingly, colonial titles have rested uniformly 
upon Crown grants. The rule, he concludes, has been enforced by England 
both in its American colonies and in Australia, and also by the United 
States. 105 
Martin, like his fellow-judge, presumes that native title coexists with 
some sort of underlying title of the Crown, but he does not attempt to 
characterize either with much exactitude. Native title, in his view, continues 
to exist following the Crown's acquisition of sovereignty until extinguished 
in favour of the Crown. It is not a mere creature of policy, but constitutes a 
legal title cognizable by the courts. '°6 Speaking of the New Zealand Land 
Claims Ordinance of 1841, Martin states: "It is everywhere assumed that 
where the Native owners have fairly and freely parted with their lands the 
same at once vest in the Crown, and become subject wholly to the disposing 
power of the Crown." 101 Later he reiterates: "So soon, then, as the right of 
the Native owner is withdrawn, the soil vests entirely in the Crown for the 
behoof of the nation." 108 The use of the term "Native owner" in both 
passages seems significant. Martin sums up his views as follows: "whenever 
the original Native right is ceded in respect of any portion of the soi1 of 
these Islands, the right which succeeds thereto is not the right of any in-
dividual subject of the Crown, ... but the right of the Crown on behalf of 
the whole nation .... "He continues: "the land becomes from the moment 
of cession not the private property of one man, but the heritage of the whole 
people; . . . "i 09 
These observations leave little room for doubt that the native in-
habitants are considered to hold a legal title akin to ownership, which passes 
to the Crown upon surrender and thereby completes the Crown's title. 
Nevertheless, near the end of this judgment Martin makes a puzzling 
remark. Referring to the plaintiff's claim that a private purchase of native 
land overrides a subsequent Crown grant, he states that the plaintiff "can-
not possibly stand in a better position than did the original land claimants. 
He cannot possess, any more than they did, a title against the Crown or the 
Crown's grantee." 110 Some have taken this to mean that the Crown's title to 
native-held lands is complete even prior to the surrender of native title, or at 
least that a Crown grant effectively extinguishes native rights. Such an inter-
'
0
' Ibid., at 393. 
10
• He quotes Kent's Commentaries on American Law: "The Natives were admitted 
to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain 
possession of it and to use it according to their own discretion ... "; ibid., at 393. 
'
0
' Ibid., at 394. 
'
0
' Ibid., at 395. 
'"' Ibid., at 396. 
110 Ibid., at 398. 
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pretation, however, cannot easily be squared with earlier passages. It seems 
more likely that Martin means only to emphasize that native title does not 
stan~ in opp~sition to the Crown's title (or that of a Crown grantee), but 
coexists with it. Even assuming, then, that the plaintiff stood in the shoes of 
the original native owners, this would not enable him to secure the annul-
ment of a Crown grant. His title, like that of the natives, far from being in-
consistent with the Crown's title, would amount to a burden upon it until 
extinguished by surrender. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The reasoning in the Symonds case is particularly interesting because it 
extends the basic principles laid down for the American colonies by Chief 
Justice Marshall to a British colony acquired at a later stage, under different 
circumstances, in a distant region of the world. The essential link is provid-
ed by British colonial law. Although the judges in Symonds do not refer to 
Johnson and Worcester by name, it is clear that they draw heavily upon 
these decisions for inspiration. 111 
In Canada as well, courts have looked to Marshall's judgments for 
guidance on questions of aboriginal rights. The process began as early as 
1867, the year of Confederation, when Justice Monk of the Quebec 
Superior Court quoted at length from Worcester in a judgment upholding 
the validity of a marriage between a white man and an Indian woman under 
Cree customary law. 112 Marshall's views were cited extensively in the 
famous St. Catherine's Milling Co. case, as it moved through the Ontario 
and Canadian courts to the Privy Council. 1 u Justice Strong's comments in 
the Supreme Court of Canada seem particularly apt: 
The value and importance of these authorities is not merely that they show 
that the same doctrine as that already propounded regarding the title of 
the Indians to unsurrendered lands prevails in the United States, but, what 
is of vastly greater importance, they without exception refer its origin to a 
date anterior to the revolution and recognise it as a continuance of the 
principles oflaw or policy as to Indian titles then established by the British 
government, and therefore identical with those which have aJso continued 
to be recognized and applied in British North America. 114 
111 See references to the attitude of United States courts and to Kent's Commentaries 
(which summarizes the Marshall doctrine), ibid .. , at 388, 390, 392, 393-94. 
111 Connolly v. Woo/rich (1867), 17 R.J.R.Q. 75 at 84-86 (Que. S.C.); also reported 
at 11 LC. Jur. 197. The decision was upheld on appeal sub nom. Johnstone v. 
Connolly (1869), 17 R.J.R.Q. 266, 1 R.L.O.S. 253 (Que. Q.B.). 
'" St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1885), 10 0.R. 196 (Ont. 
Ch.) per Boyd, C., at 209 (Johnson); (1886), 13 0.A.R. 148 (Ont. C.A.) per Bur-
ton, J.A., at 160 (Johnson), per Patterson, J.A., at 169 (Story's Commentaries, 
summarizing the ruling in Johnson); (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 per Ritchie, C.J., at 
600 (Story's Commentaries, summarizing Johnson), per Strong, J., at 608, 
610-12, 633-34 (Johnson, Worcester, Kent's Commentaries), per Taschereau, J ., 
at 642 (Breaux v. Johns citing Johnson). 
"
4 (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 610. 
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The Privy Council:s decision in St. Catherine's does not explicitly refer to 
the Marshall doctrme. However both Johnson and Worcester are cited in 
~rgument, ~sis.the Symonds case, 115 and the Privy Council's characteriza-
tion of Indian title as a usufructuary right burdening the underlying title of 
the Crown shows the influence of Marshall's thinking. 116 
. ~ore recent~y, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the leading Canadian 
d~c1~~?n o~ ~bonginal title, Calder v. Attorney-General of British Colum-
bia, explicitly adopted the Marshall doctrine. Although the court split on 
~he result, the. two major opinions written, representing six of the seven 
Judges, b<_>th cite Johnson and Worcester approvingly, and quote extracts 
f~om the JU?gments. 118 Justice Judson, in particular, notes that the Cana-
dian ,court~ ~n th; St. f!a.therine's case were "strongly influenced" by Mar-
shall s .dec1S1on m defmmg the nature of Indian title, and that the Privy 
Council followed their lead. 
It seems safe to conclude that the new Canadian Constitution in ]ts 
rec?~nition and affirmation of "existing aboriginal rights'', repres;nts an 
official ~nd~>rsement of the b.asic tenets of the doctrine of aboriginal title, 
~nd .a re1ect10n of the competmg theories of a legal vacuum, radical discon-
tmmty, and common law dispossession. 119 This provision stands witness to 
the remarkable vitality of the ideas put forward by Chief Justice Marshall, 
more than a century and a half after they were first expressed. 
"' (1888), 14 A.C. 46 at 48 (P.C.). 
"•Ibid., at 54-55, 58. 
11
' (1973), 34 D.L.R. (Jd) 145 (S.C.C.). 
'" Ibid., per Judson, J., at 151. (Martland and Ritchie, JJ., concurring), per Hall, J ., 
at 193-96 (Spence ~nd Laskin, JJ., concurring). See also the more recent remarks 
of Mahoney, J., m Hamlet of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and 
11
, Nor~hern Development, [1980} 1.F.C. 518 at 556-57 (F.C.T.D.). 
Secuon 35(1), Constitution Act, 1982. 

